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INTRODUCTION: THE NORM OF EFFICIENCY IN THE LAW
The central norm in law and economics is efficiency-not
efficiency in the sense of the efficiency of some means to an end,
but in the sense of productive and allocative efficiency. The norm
has slowly risen to take its place as perhaps the dominant norm of
many parts of the law, especially contract and tort law. Oddly,
however, it is not a simple or transparent notion as articulated in
legal discourse, and it has been the subject of continuing theoretical
debate. I wish to trace the rise and explication of this norm from
the work of Thomas Hobbes to the present day.
The development of the notion of efficiency has, of course, been
facilitated by the fact that it is centrally important in economics. It
de facto gives normative underpinnings to economics, even when
economists insist that they wish to keep normative and explanatory
issues separate. In contemporary law and economics, efficiency is
held to be both an explanatory and a normative notion. Indeed, it
is taken to be explanatory just because it is viewed normatively as
very compelling. Judges and parties to suits implicitly share the
norm and, therefore, it governs the common law, even though
legislation sometimes violates the norm.
There is a grievous theoretical problem with a principle of
efficiency, namely, how to handle allocations across interacting
parties. If we can make interpersonal comparisons of costs and
benefits between people, we have no need for a principle of
allocative efficiency nor, given relevant social scientific and
technological theories, for a principle of productive efficiency. If
we cannot make interpersonal comparisons, any principle of
efficiency must reduce essentially to a principle of mutual advan-
tage. This principle raises its own difficult problem. We generally
t Earlier versions of this Article were presented on a panel at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Sept. 1992, at the Chicago-
Kent College of Law legal theory workshop, the Yale Law School legal theory
workshop, and the seminar of the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George
Mason University. I wish to thank participants on all of these occasions for critical
comments on earlier drafts. Richard A. Posner and Rogers Smith gave extensive
commentaries. I also thank Paul Bullen for research assistance and the Andrew W.
Mellon and Russell Sage Foundations for general support.
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need recourse to legal action only when there is an issue that, in
some sense, cannot be settled to the mutual advantage of both or all
parties. Hence, there typically cannot be an efficient resolution of
a particular case.
Consider rules that appear to be efficient, such as stare decisis.
It has almost no content. It has, however, three great values. First,
it contributes to stable expectations on the parts of almost all actors,
both those governed by the law and those in the legal system itself.
In this respect, the rule is strategically effective in giving actors an
incentive to behave in more productive ways. Second, the rule
greatly reduces the overall volume of cases that must be litigated or
heard, in part by changing behavior in ways that arguably reduce the
likelihood of parties' resorting to litigation. It also plausibly gives
such clear signals about how courts would rule that potential
litigants avoid the waste of a trial. Third, it greatly reduces decision
costs of judges in many cases that are heard. In all of these ways,
the rule is likely to be enormously efficient unless the state of the
world to which it is applied is changing in some important way. Let
us briefly discuss two of these considerations, while holding the
third for later.1
The first of the great values of stare decisis is essentially
Hobbes's central thesis applied to law. Hobbes argued that any
government that produced order should be supported because the
risks from trying to change it would be mutually harmful.2 Many
rules share this feature of stare decisis, although they may often be
efficient primarily for the strategic reason that they affect behavior
ex ante. For example, consider the Hadley v. Baxendale rule against
consequential damages.' If I know that my use of your product or
service has much greater risks at stake for me than you have reason
typically to expect it to have, I am responsible for taking extra
precautions; otherwise, I will suffer the extra costs. You have to
make good only the defective product or service, not such conse-
quential damages. Hence, I may behave differently in using your
product. Even if I eventually wish to sue you for the great losses I
have suffered, I will be deterred by most lawyers I might consult.
' See infra part IV.B.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 380 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968).
s See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151, 9 Ex. 341 (1854) ("Where two
parties have made a contract which one of them has broken the damages.., should
be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally ... or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties.").
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If nevertheless I do sue, the judge will not require much delibera-
tion to decide against me.
It is striking that the judge who rules from efficiency under stare
decisis or the Hadley v. Baxendale bar to consequential damages rules
from outside the case at hand. This fact complicates the claim that
efficiency explains the content of the common law, which includes
the content of decisions in various cases plus the rules that can be
derived from those cases. It raises the questions what the norm of
efficiency is and how it works. To answer the first of these, we can
trace the norm's evolution in response to problems that various
thinkers were attempting to resolve. An answer to the second
question must start from the possibility that few judges ever make
inferences about the relative efficiencies at stake in the cases on
which they rule. Hence, we would have to show that subsidiary
rules of thumb or norms that judges actually follow are themselves
efficient, which is to say that following these norms serves the
mutual advantage of all concerned. In this Article, I will suggest a
model of how such subsidiary norms could be genuine norms that
are internally reinforced by members of the legal community, most
notably by judges. In Part I, I will offer a brief discussion of the
collective implication of self-interest, which is mutual advantage. In
Part II, I canvass the development of views on the efficiency of law,
from Hobbes to Posner. Part III discusses the biggest change in
view over the course of that development: the elevation of marginal
over fundamental values. Part IV considers efficiency as a norm in
the legal system, for litigants and for officers of the legal system.
Part V briefly addresses the claim that concern with efficiency leads
to conservatism in the law, and then, finally, Part VI concludes with
general remarks on the problems of mutual advantage arguments in
the law.
I. THE COLLECTIVE IMPLICATION OF SELF-INTEREST
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, micro-
economics and utilitarianism developed together. At the turn of the
century G.E. Moore was the first major utilitarian philosopher who
did not also write on economics; indeed, economists might not be
surprised to learn that he mangled value theory and therewith
utilitarianism. His value theory reverted to the crude notion that
some value inheres in objects independently of anyone's use of or
pleasure in those objects.4 A variant of this notion lies behind the
4 See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPLA ETHICA 84 (1903) (arguing that the whole may be
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labor theory of value, according to which the value of an object is
the quantity of total labor time for producing it.5
Although many (perhaps most) economists in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition continued to be utilitarian after the turn of the century, in
philosophy utilitarianism separated from economics and, therefore,
unfortunately, from developments in economic value theory.
6
Since then the two traditions have been brought back together most
extensively in the contemporary movement of law and economics.
This rejoining recalls the early origins of the general utilitarian
justification of government in the theory of Thomas Hobbes. In
both law and economics and in Hobbes's theory of the sovereign,
the principal focus is on normative justification. And in both, the
basic principle of justification is self-interest somehow generalized
to the collective level.
The distinctive unity of the visions I will canvass in the develop-
ment from Hobbes to Coase and on to contemporary law and
economics is that they are all welfarist. But Hobbes, Pareto, and
Coase are not part of the Benthamite classical utilitarian aberration
in interpersonally additive welfarism. It is therefore perhaps less
misleading here to speak of welfare rather than of utility, although
the contemporary notion of utility is manifold in its range of mean-
ings. The chief reason for speaking of welfare rather than utility is
that the language of welfare is different from that of utility.
Typically we do not want more welfare, although we often want
greater than the sum of its parts and vice versa).
' The most renowned exponent of a labor theory of value was Karl Marx, whose
position is given in 1 KARL MARX, CA'ITAL, 41-48 (Ernest Untermann ed. & trans.,
Random House 1906) (Frederick Engels ed., 4th ed. 1890). For careful exegeses and
criticisms, see GERALD A. COHEN, HISTORY, LABOUR, AND FREEDOM: THEMES FROM
MARX 209-38 (1988) and Fernando Vianello, Labour Theory of Value, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 107-13 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS].
6John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick, the great nineteenth-century utilitarians,
both wrote treatises on economics. In the early decades of the twentieth century,
G.E. Moore, who set the direction of utilitarian thought among philosophers, did not
write on and evidently had no interest in economics. He returned speculation on
value to the Platonic mode of pure reason. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Many of the outstanding problems in economic value theory were resolved in Moore's
time by Vilfredo Pareto, see infra note 8 and accompanying text, and the exponents
of the ordinalist revolution who followed his lead. Economists such as F.Y.
Edgeworth and A.C. Pigou were avowedly utilitarian, as is suggested by the very title
we now give to public economics: welfare economics. See FRANCIS Y. EDGEWORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE
MORAL SCIENCES (A.M. Kelley 1967) (1881); A.C. PICOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (1938).
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greater welfare. Welfare, unlike utility, is not a cardinal value made
up of smaller bits of welfare. The language of welfare is typically
ordinalist.
The normative foundations of the formulations of Hobbes,
Pareto, and Coase are essentially the same. Hobbes emphasized
that all we have are individual values (essentially the values of self-
interest-survival and welfare) and that individuals can be motivated
only by resolutions of their collective problem that speak to their
interests.7 Pareto, writing after a century of Benthamite additive
utilitarianism, asserted that we do not know what aggregation of
utility across individuals means, that it is a metaphysical notion.'
Both Hobbes and Pareto therefore evidently supposed that we can
ground a motivational theory only in disaggregated individual
values. The only collective value that can be directly imputed from
these individual values is mutual advantage, in which all gain
(Hobbes's usual assumption) or, at least, none loses, while at least
one gains (Pareto's assumption).
Coase is less concerned to state his value position than were
Hobbes and Pareto, but his position also seems clearly to suppose
that collective values are reducible to individual values or that the
only values of concern in his accounts are individual values. An
example of this move is in Coase's discussion of the negotiations
between a rancher and a farmer on the optimizing of returns from
theirjoint enterprises. The total net profits from the farmer's crops
and the rancher's cattle are a function of their sales value less the
costs of raising them. This total is essentially a cardinal measure, in
dollars. Suppose these profits could be increased by letting the
cattle roam over part of the farmer's crops, thereby destroying
them, but that the farmer has the legal right to fence her land
against the cattle. The two then have an interest in striking a deal
that allows the cattle to roam over part of the farmer's land.9 They
can do so because each can be made ordinally better off by making
the deal.
For all three theorists, we may speak of mutual advantage as the
collective implication of self-interest. We could say that, in this
view, collective value is emergent because it merely reflects what
7 See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 223; see also id. ch. 13.
8 See VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 47-51, 105-06 (Ann S.
Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., A.M. Kelley 1971) (1927).
9 See RONALD H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND
THE LAW 95, 99 (1988).
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individuals want; but we could also say that letting individual values
prevail is the ultimate value. If we speak of collective value in any
other sense, we import some additional notion of value into the
discussion beyond the interests of individuals. Hobbes may have
been constitutionally oblivious of any such additional notions of
value; Pareto evidently believed them perverse.1
0
The general position of all of these contributors to legal and
political theory is utilitarian, although some of them have claimed
not to be utilitarian or have not extensively addressed their
normative assumptions. Law might be supposed to have purposes
other than the enhancement of welfare. For example, Joseph Raz
argues that its purpose should be the enhancement of autonomy.
He then speaks of the virtue of the law as its efficiency-the virtue
of an instrument as an instrument-because he supposes law is a
means." More generally, one might argue from any moral per-
spective that law should be efficient in achieving whatever it does
achieve; but the tradition from Hobbes to Coase and law and
economics makes efficiency the goal that law is to achieve. The
efficiency is not merely of the instrument of law, but rather of its
effects on the society it serves. In this vision, efficiency is itself a
welfarist notion: Greater efficiency implies greater welfare.
II. INDETERMINACY ON THE FRONTIER
The greatest theoretical difficulty for the ordinalist, welfarist
program of mutual advantage is the severe indeterminacy presented
by choices that cannot be summarized with cardinal aggregation.
Various states of affairs may be better than the current state, but no
one of them may be better than the others. How can we justify
choosing one of these over the others? Or how can we justify saying
one of them is best? There have been two nearly magic moves to
resolve the seemingly insurmountable problems of indeterminacy-
the first by Hobbes, the second by Coase.
Hobbes used ignorance about the particular advantages or
disadvantages of possible regimes to allow a more or less random
choice that is better than the status quo. We do not need to choose
a particular form of government; rather, we may simply pick one as
we might pick a ball from an urn. 2 This is a strictly ordinal claim,
10 See id.
" See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 226
(1979).2 See generally Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and
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not a cardinal one."3 Indeterminacy gives a plausible solution to
Hobbes while it gets in the way for Pareto because the comparisons
that concern Pareto are not so drastic as the difference between
government and no government. Coase resolves further indeter-
minacy introduced by production with his cardinal money measure,
which yields ordinal information about individual preferences or
interests, as discussed below in Part II.D.
A perplexing implication of Coase's resolution is that it is
inherently a marginalist resolution. Hobbes addressed the funda-
mental issue of how to justify government or even a particular
government, while forcefully eschewing debates at the margins.
Coase addresses the issue of justifying a particular kind of resolu-
tion of marginal problems that arise under government. Because a
state and a going economy are taken for granted in Coase's
problems, there exists money with which to negotiate tradeoffs and
compensations. There are no dollars with which to perform Coase's
magic under Hobbes's conditions. There is a sense, then, in which
Coase may build on Hobbes's program to resolve more detailed
questions in actual, ongoing law.
Before returning more fully to the fit of the Hobbesian and
Coasean resolutions and their normative underpinnings, I will
briefly summarize the main moves of Hobbes, Bentham, Pareto,
Coaise, and Richard Posner.
14
A. Hobbes
Hobbes's central argument for the creation or maintenance of
a government was that government brings order where otherwise
there would be destructive anarchy. 5 In the order created by
government, we can each confidently invest effort in our own
Choosing, 44 Soc. RES. 757-85 (1977) (discussing the philosophy of preference and
choice).
" To say that A is better than B is merely an ordinal claim. The claim entails that
we can rank A and B in an ordering. For example, you may prefer coffee to tea even
though you have no sense of whether you derive, say, twice as much pleasure from
a cup of coffee as from a cup of tea. To say that A is twice as good as B is a cardinal
claim. This claim entails that we have a measure of the difference between A and B.
Over a normal range of daily expenditures, for example, money has approximately
cardinal value to us. We can add and subtract numbers of dollars and we can assess
their proportional relationships.
' Some of these are more extensively discussed in Russell Hardin, Efficiency, in
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 462 (Robert E. Goodin &
Philip Pettit eds., 1993).
'5 See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 223.
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property and secure our own greater welfare; we can engage in
mutually beneficial cooperation. 6 Using our language, we may
retrospectively say that Hobbes's value theory was individualist and
ordinalist. To some degree, two hundred fifty years earlier, Hobbes
evidently shared Pareto's antipathy to interpersonal comparisons.
He was concerned only with improvements to each and every
person's existence, not with some additive notion of overall
improvement. But Hobbes's view was different in one very
important sense. He was not statically concerned with optimizing
welfare by reallocating value among us through exchange of what we
already have. Rather, he was dynamically concerned with giving us
the opportunity to produce more and thereby to increase our wel-
fare. 17
Clearly, in moving from no government to government, we may
have numerous possible governments from which to choose. Some
of these may be better for me, others may be better for you.
Although we may agree that in principle all are better off with any
one of these governments than with no government, we may not
agree that one of them is better than all others. We seem to face
gross indeterminacy in the move from no government. Hobbes
resolved this indeterminacy with a trick.
He supposed that we know too little about the effectiveness of
various forms of government to be very confident of the superiority
(for our own interest) of any one form over any other.1 8 By
invoking skepticism about social science knowledge, we escape the
apparent conflict of interest over which form of government to
choose. On the other hand, Hobbes supposed that the transition
from an extant government to a new form of government would be
too costly to justify any improvement it might bring-at least to the
generation making the change." Why? The initial disorder would
swamp the benefits in the short run. Here, an unduly confident
social scientific claim-that any effort at reform must bring disas-
ter-secures commitment to an actual government.
Hence, whether we are moving from no government to
government or attempting to improve an existing government, we
face a simple coordination problem of getting to or staying at a
universally preferred state. Our choice is a matter of mutual
16 See id. at 376; see also id. at 186-88.
'7 See id. at 376.
18 See id. at 238.
19 See THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 36 (Howard Warrender ed., 1983) (1651).
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advantage, which again is the collective implication of self-inter-
est.
20
A striking feature of Hobbes's view is that it is a relative
assessment of whole states of affairs: life under one form of
government versus life under another or under no government at
all. Hobbes thought that efforts at reform posed too great a risk of
revolution and violent anarchy to be justified by their supposed
benefits to us.21 Most of the governmental decisions we actually
face concern minor changes in what we have been doing. Many of
these decisions would not even be called reforms, but even changes
of a more far-reaching nature that might be called "reformist" seem
to pose little or no risk of revolution. As a social scientific matter,
therefore, we may disagree with Hobbes's blanket rejection of
reforms. We may suppose that the reforms and lesser decisions of
our quotidian political life are merely marginal changes in the gross
form of government we have, and we do not risk full breakdown
when we push for them.
B. Bentham
Jeremy Bentham resolved the problem of indeterminacy for
those whose social science was more extensive and open than that
of Hobbes. Bentham compared states of affairs according to the
sum of utility in each state. He supposed that each individual's
utility could be measured cardinally with accuracy and that the
utilities of various people could be added. There might still be
indeterminacy in the ranking of possible outcomes because two or
more outcomes might have the same aggregate utility, but this is a
minor problem in comparison to the more general problem of the
indeterminacy of rankings based exclusively on principles of mutual
advantage. Bentham's solution, of course, could violate the
Hobbesian assumption of mutual advantage because, for example,
my utility could be less in one state of affairs than in another and
yet the first might be ranked higher than the second in aggregate
utility.
Bentham's supposition that utility can be cardinally added across
individuals is the main aberration in the line of development from
Hobbes to Coase. Something like Benthamite cardinal utilityfor the
20 For a full account, see Russell Hardin, Hobbesian Political Order, 19 POL. THEORY
156-80 (1991).
2' See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 380.
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individual still has appeal in some contexts, such as risky deci-
sions.12 Interpersonal comparison of utility also has great appeal
in some contexts. For example, it is universally assumed by econo-
mists and social scientists who make policy recommendations,
especially in cost-benefit analyses, and it is smuggled into standard
treatments in law and economics. Cost-benefit analysis obviously
assumes interpersonal comparison in adding everyone's benefits and
subtracting everyone's costs to evaluate a proposal. Posner's wealth
maximization theory makes a similar assumption,2 but the rigid
notion of accurately and interpersonally additive utility plays its
intellectual role in helping to clarify what is of concern by showing
ways not to go. Still, because rough interpersonal comparison is
both useful and compelling in certain contexts, we might welcome
a variant of the Benthamite value theory that could combine
ordinalism with rough interpersonal comparisons.
A further objection to Benthamite utility is that it requires a
zero-utility level. For ordinalists, such a fixed point of reference is
a meaningless supposition. They might go further and agree with
many writers who assert the psychological point that we have no
innate standard of goodness or value. For example, Hume supposes
we only judge value by comparison, not by intrinsic worth or
value. 24 It might seem to follow that we must be marginalists, that
we cannot judge whole states of affairs. This conclusion, however,
does not follow because we can in fact make the kind of judgment
Hobbes makes-order under government is better than violent chaos
for virtually all-as a strictly comparative judgment. Thus, Hobbes
and the other ordinalists do not require us to establish a zero-point
or a metric for how good any state of affairs is or would be.
C. Pareto
Vilfredo Pareto combined Hobbes's normative principle of
mutual advantage with marginalist concern. Indeed, Pareto
formulated his principles to avoid interpersonal comparisons and
attendant moral judgments.25 Hence, Pareto was very Hobbesian
in his motivations. We face a potential Pareto improvement if, as
22 See KennethJ. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Nos on Rawls's Theory ofJustice,
70J. PHIL. 245, 250, 256 (1973).
2' See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
24 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 593 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., 1978) (1739-40).
See PARETO, supra note 8, at 47-51.
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compared to the status quo, there is a state in which none of us is
worse off and at least one is better off. Unfortunately, there may be
many states that are Pareto improvements over our status quo, and
we may have severe conflicts of interest over which improvement to
choose. The Pareto principles, therefore, reintroduce indeter-
minacy.
The Pareto principles are, in the first instance, static principles
about the distribution of those goods we already have. They are not
dynamic or production-oriented. In this respect, they might seem
to be an aberration, as is Benthamite additive utility if it is done
with precision; but the Paretian analysis of static efficiency accounts
for a real issue and is not an aberration. It may nevertheless be
largely beside the point for our purposes, although it returns
through Coasean efficiency in law and economics. The indeter-
minacy of the notion of Pareto improvement is in the allocation of
some surplus available to us beyond the status quo. Most alloca-
tions of the surplus might make every one of us better off and
would, therefore, be mutually advantageous.
There are other difficulties in the Pareto criteria that we need
not discuss here.26 Perhaps the most important is that the transac-
tion costs of getting to a Pareto improvement over our status quo
can be substantial, even when there is no indeterminacy. For
example, to make an improvement might require joint action by
many parties at once or a multi-party exchange. In the first case, we
might face problems of the logic of collective action that make the
Pareto improving move virtually impossible. In the second, the
transaction costs might block our making an improvement if they
are greater than the gains from the improvement. Finally, the
standard representation of the Pareto principles with a well-defined
curve or frontier is oddly misleading. One might naturally suppose
that the geometric representation yields actual measures of welfare
for relevant individuals. It does not because there are no such
measures for Pareto; there are merely relative, ordinal comparisons.
There is no metric for the space in which a Pareto diagram is
drawn.
2 See generally Russell Hardin, Difficulties in the Notion of Economic Rationality, 23
SOC. SC!. INFO. 453-67 (1984) (citing the problems of strategic interaction and value
theory).
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D. Coase
The principle of Pareto improvement is indeterminate because
it cannot tell us which of many choices, all of which are superior to
the status quo, we should make. We might suppose that intro-
ducing concern with dynamic efficiency would compound that
indeterminacy. The Coase theorem explains why this conclusion
need not follow. In essence, the theorem says that, no matter what
the assignment of legal rights to use a particular property, it will be
used by the producer who can achieve the highest net income from
production, unless transaction costs swamp the potential gains from
transacting to reassign the "rights." Why? Because the titular
owner of the right will bargain it away to a more efficient producer
for a relevant share of the greater income that that producer can
achieve.
2 7
We might suppose that this move turns money into a cardinal
utility or welfare measure, but it does not. It merely assumes that,
all else being equal, more money is better than less for every
individual. Suppose we face two (or more) outcomes. The market
values in outcome A are higher than those in outcome B. Hence,
in A there are more dollars to be shared, and all parties can in
principle be made better off (transaction costs may be prohibitive).
This is strictly an ordinal claim; or rather, it is an ordinal claim for
each party. It assumes nothing about the total value to each party;
it merely assumes that each party can be made better off. The move
from less dollars to more can be made as a move of mutual advantage.
That is why we can generally expect it to be made if the costs of
transaction do not block it.
For present purposes, we may distinguish four main moves of
Coase: First, Coase's theorem trades on the fact-value distinction.
There is nothing inherently good or right about the way a burden
is to be shared merely in the facts of the matter.2 8 What, for
example, makes action X a nuisance? Surprisingly much writing on
nuisances has ignored this question, perhaps because many writers
are closet deontological libertarians who think they know when
property and related rights are being violated. Coase is evidently a
legal positivist-as was Hobbes-who thinks of rights as matters of
law or legal rules. Hence, although we might use injunction for
' See Coase, supra note 9, at 97-104.
28 See id. at 96, 119-33.
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efficiency reasons, we may not have a moral reason or right to use
it, contrary to common implicit assumption.
Second, the core normative content of Coase's theorem is that
of Hobbes, Hume, and Pareto: mutual advantage as the collective
implication of self-interest. If one outcome is more productive than
another, we can all be made better off by reaching it with relevant
compensations. The Coase theorem is not indeterminate about our
collective pattern of production-we will end up where total
production is greatest; but it is indeterminate about how we will
share the benefits of our greater productivity. Hence, its indeter-
minacy matches that of Pareto's principles. It is indeterminate
about the allocation of the final profit that we have after settling on
maximum production.
29
Third, we have to look at costs and benefits to all concerned in
an interaction. This follows straightforwardly from Coase's implicit
assumption of mutual advantage as his underlying principle of
justification. But we do not simply add these costs and benefits.
We look only to ordinal judgments by the relevant parties, without
recourse to interpersonal comparisons. Coase's examples are often
two-party interactions with no external effects on other parties
assumed."0 If there are such effects, however, these must be taken
into account.
Fourth, we have to take real world constraints of transaction
costs and political-legal institutions into consideration. If transac-
tion costs are nil, all systems of entitlements will lead to efficient
production. If transaction costs are low, all parties to an interaction
might easily be brought to understand that there could be a mutual
advantage resolution. If transaction costs are high enough,
however, there may be no prospect of improving on a status quo
allocation of rights.
For many law and economics scholars, a corollary follows from
these moves: because information and bargaining costs may be
high, incomplete contracts may be efficient and may require court
resolution to fill in the gaps."1 Note that this corollary is analo-
gous to Hobbes's move to justify government, which will resolve
such problems as marginal gaps in our initial design. Similarly, in
many works, James Buchanan and various co-authors argue that we
29 See id. at 100.
"o See id. at 98.
31 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-36
(1983).
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may agree ex ante on a constitutional device or procedure for
handling marginal problems on which we would not agree.32 More
generally, for all of life's interactions with legally unanticipated
conflicts, we might want court resolutions that establish principles
of resolution from efficiency considerations.
There are three peculiarities of Coase's device that should be
noted. First, for Coase's device to work there must be a going
market with prices for the products at issue.
Second, the Coasean allocation is not directly representable on
a Pareto diagram. The actual range of allocations will run from all
of our net profit from renegotiating the use of our rights going to
you, to all of it going to me. This would be representable as a
straight line in income at a slope of minus one. Because income
need not translate uniformly into welfare, the Pareto frontier in
welfare need not be a straight line. Indeed, as noted above, unlike
the income frontier, the Paretian welfare frontier is not cardinal."3
All we can say about the welfare frontier then is that, ceteris
paribus, the higher your share of our net income from reallocating
our production rights, the greater your welfare.
And third, Coasean resolution maximizes productive income
only subject to the constraint that the parties choose to trade off
various other things for income. Income has value only as a
resource for consumptions. Hence, neither party to a Coasean
transaction over the use of property rights could reasonably neglect
the effects of reallocation on consumptions in general. For
example, if the farmer is willing to pay a premium for peace and
quiet, the available net gain from higher production may be
substantially less than if the farmer did not value such consumption
highly.
How does Coase's resolution of collective interactions differ
from Hobbes's justification of political order? For Hobbes the
differences between forms of government "is scarce sensible" in
comparison to the difference between any working government and
either anarchy or civil war. 4 This too is a strictly ordinal claim,
not a cardinal one. Indeterminacy gets in the way for Pareto. It is
irrelevant to Hobbes, largely for epistemological or social scientific
reasons. And Coase resolves indeterminacies that might be
s2 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN &JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES 28-.
31 (1985).
-" See supra part II.C.
34 HOBBES, supra note 2, at 238.
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introduced by alternative regimes of production. He does so with
his cardinal money measure, which yields ordinal information about
individual preferences or interests.
E. Posner
Richard Posner has proposed wealth maximization as an
alternative normative principle for what the law should accom-
plish.35 We allocate a right to the use of a particular property to
the producer who can produce the greatest net wealth from its use,
but we do this through the law, and not just through bargains struck
by the titular owner and a hopeful producer. We can thereby
achieve the greatest productivity, even in the face of transaction
costs that might block bargaining. In a sense then, wealth maximi-
zation is merely a variant of Coasean efficiency, but it is a variant
with a Benthamite kick. It would be wrong to claim that greater
aggregate wealth corresponds to greater aggregate welfare, but
Posner claims that greater aggregate wealth is a good thing in its
own right.
3 6
The great trick of Coase is to convert general income from
higher production into money shares that can be allocated to make
all relevant individuals ordinally better off.37 Income is treated
cardinally and interpersonally, even though it has no value except
as a means. Nevertheless, the welfare gains of individuals that come
from gains in income are still ordinal and need not be interperson-
ally comparable. Hence, we can reach mutually beneficial outcomes
by using higher money income as a device. This trick is accom-
plished by a market economy in which money allows trades to
become generalized without the need for direct matching of
substantive demands and supplies between particular parties. It is
a mistake both in the judgment of the market with money and in
Coasean monetary assessments to focus on money as somehow the
real value of what is going on because it is merely a means to the
allocation of values.
Wealth maximization without compensation is a genuinely
cardinal concept that requires interpersonal comparisons of
something, namely monetary wealth. My wealth of $1000 plus your
35 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 12-16 (4th ed. 1992).
36 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 65-78, 108 (1981); see also
GeorgeJ. Stigler, Wealth, and Possibly Liberty, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1978).
31 See supra part III.D.
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wealth of $10,000 sums to a total wealth of $11,000. If, however, I
have $3000 and you have $6000, our total is only $9000, which,
according to the criterion of wealth maximization, is inferior, even
though I, or a fairness theorist, might think the situation much
better. A rigid ordinalist might defend the efficiency of a Coasean
allocation with the claim that there is no ground for the interper-
sonal comparison of welfare implicit in a claim of fairness; however,
Posner cannot fend off the fairness theorist in this way because he
has accepted interpersonal comparison of at least wealth."8
Moreover, we could have wealth maximization at two very
different distributions. In distribution A I have $1000 and you have
$10,000. In distribution B I have $10,000 and you have $1000.
Suppose we could end in either distribution. On a compensation
principle required for making purely ordinal claims, if we choose A
or have it imposed on us by a court, I should be compensated for
my losses, if any, in moving from the status quo to the new state.
Should I also be compensated for my opportunity losses in settling
on A rather than B?
Ordinary wealth is a resource rather than a good in its own
right. It is good instrumentally because it is a means to various
ends, such as welfare. Resources are problematic because they are
typically surrendered in return for consumptions. A welfarist
counts consumptions as increments to welfare and resources as
potential contributions to welfare, so that welfare subsumes
resources. A resourcist who omitted consumptions from an
accounting would count only unspent resources. The painfully risk-
averse miser who spent as little as possible would have greater
resources than the reasonable person of a similar income who led
a life of fulfilling consumptions. Hence, to make his resource
measure complete, Posner includes in it all past consumptions and
even one's consumer surplus.3
9
Unfortunately, bringing in consumer surplus may involve double
counting. My consumer surplus means that I get more for my
money than I would have received at higher prices. Should we
count both my consumer surplus and the greater quantity of goods
I get as part of my total wealth? At the limit, I cannot have spent
more than my income and can therefore only have accumulated the
goods I have bought. If I have a consumer surplus from those
" See Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and
Kronman, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 251 (1980).
39 See POSNER, supra note 36, at 92.
MAGIC ON THE FRONTIER
purchases, it is, once my income is spent, not available to me for
further spending. It is not a resource.
F. Summary Comparisons
In his vision of dynamic efficiency, Hobbes runs welfarist and
resourcist views together: Increasing efficiency ipso facto increases
welfare. The efficiency he wanted is just a matter of greater welfare
individual by individual. Coase's theorem also is resourcist in its
move to prices and income, but this move is only a temporary
device for getting to welfare. Posner's move is far more complex,
and perhaps less coherent. It blends welfare considerations into the
prima facie resourcist notion of wealth. In the end, some such
move may be conceptually required of all of these theories, because
consumptions, welfare, and resources either trade off against each
other or are mutually constituted. The value theory of all five of
these theorists is individualist and subjective: It is the values of the
subjects that count. Hobbes seems to have thought that some values
are objective in the sense that any rational person would hold them,
and the other theorists may hold a similar view.
III. MARGINAL VS. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
One perplexing implication of Coase's resolution is that it is
inherently marginalist. Hobbes addressed the fundamental issue of
how to justify government in general or even a particular govern-
ment. Coase addresses the issue ofjustifying a particular resolution
of a marginal problem that might arise under government. Again,
there are no dollars with which to perform Coase's magic under
Hobbes's conditions. Dollars come into existence as a result of
Hobbes's resolution; they do not precede it.4" There is a sense
then in which Coase may build on Hobbes's program to resolve
more detailed questions in actual law. Indeed, he builds not only
on the existence of government but also on the development of
enough knowledge to make it plausible to suppose that we might
improve things, even if only at the margin. Hobbes may not have
known whether monarchy or oligarchy was the better form of
40 Some libertarians think life under anarchy much more benign and productive
than Hobbes thought it could be, and they suppose money would arise spontaneously
even without government. Indeed, money has arisen in this way in the context of
states and well-ordered societies. When it does come into being, however, money is
relevant to marginal values, not to the grand comparisons that interested Hobbes.
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government, but we may often know that assigning production
contrary to apparent ownership rights would lead to greater
productivity.
One might even claim, against Hobbes, that we are only able to
justify marginal adjustments in government. But Hobbes's assess-
ment of the goodness of government, as defined by the interests of
individuals, is conceptually coherent. Indeed, in some cases, it may
even be empirically meaningful, such as when a society that has
fallen into murderous chaos is brought back to order by external
intervention. In such a case, we might not be able to say that the
intervention brings about the best of all resolutions, but we might
be relatively confident that it works to the mutual advantage of
virtually all concerned in the previously chaotic state.
Hobbesian efficiency provides a justification.of law, that is, of
the whole system of law. Coasean efficiency, on the other hand, in
its law and economics corollary, provides arguments forjustification
in law, that is, for the specific content of particular laws or adjudica-
tions. Hobbes moves from violent anarchy to mutually beneficial
order. Coase shows that bringing in dynamic concern with
production need not compound Paretian allocative indeterminacy
with Hobbesian dynamic indeterminacy, although he does so only
at the margin. Both Hobbes and Coase are concerned with
production, not merely with allocation of what exists. In that
respect, they are quite different from Pareto, who does not success-
fully integrate production into his economics.4 Indeed, it is their
concern with production that gives them their resolutions.
Law and economics, contemporary price theory, and the
indifference curve utility theory generally revolve around issues at
the margin of a background of general arrangements. Hobbes
addressed this background and not the marginal issues. From
roughly Hume forward, most discussion has been at the margin.
John Rawls is unusual in attempting to establish principles for the
background of general arrangements.42 Henry Sidgwick (perhaps
the greatest utilitarian) argued that we do not know enough to start
from fundamentals, we can only talk intelligently about improve-
41 See A.P. Kirman, Pareto As an Economist, in 3 DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS, supra
note 5, at 804-06 (claiming that it is difficult to accept Pareto's contributions to
equilibrium theory based on his poor analysis of production).
42 SeeJOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 11 (1971) (describing his version of the
social contract, the terms of which are "principles ofjustice for the basic structure of
society").
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ments on what exists. 4 This is the ultimate pragmatic view: The
most we can expect of our efforts is that they bring improvement in
our state of affairs, not that they bring us to some well-defined final
goal.
Lon Fuller shared Hobbes's full vision of mutual advantage
coupled with limited reason. On the basis of our limited reason we
need not know the morally best state of affairs in order to judge one
state better than another: "And it is on this common sense view
that we build our institutions and practices."44 Elsewhere he
argued for what he called the "coordination function of law,"
suggesting that the law serves mutual advantage.45 Fuller was
concerned not with whether you and I make an exchange but
whether, if we wish to or stand to gain from doing so, the law will
facilitate our transaction. Contract law, tort law, and much else are,
in this sense, among the facilitative branches of the law.46
In all these systems, a specific case that is decided at law is likely
to go against one party or the other, or it must strike a compromise
over their conflicting interests. This choice cannot be merely
efficient in the sense of serving mutual advantage. It is only from
an ex ante point of view that the decision can be considered
efficient, and then only if the distribution of parties to relevantly
similar interactions is unknown (for example, where Hobbesian
ignorance makes for agreement). Hence, the resolution cannot
directly be argued on efficiency grounds; rather, the system that
permits resolutions is efficient.
47
43 See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 473-74 (7th ed. 1907) (arguing
that a morality de novo could not be constructed); see also Russell Hardin, Common
Sense at the Foundations, in ESSAYS ON HENRY SIDGWICK 143-60 (Bart Schultz ed.,
1992) (addressing the problems inherent in the concept of moral knowledge).
Sidgwick's argument is strictly welfarist rather than Benthamite utilitarian, but his
argument turns on the overwhelming demands for the knowledge and theory
required for making more than marginal claims.
4 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 32 (revised ed. 1969); see also id. at 10-
12 (describing the different conclusions reached from the premise that all moral
judgments must rest on perfection).
45 LON L. FULLER, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
ORDER 211-76 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981); see also FULLER, supra note 44, at 9
(arguing that the law creates the conditions "essential for a rational human
existence").
46 Fuller even argues that laws which are not facilitative but that attempt to block
voluntary mutual choices, such as laws prohibiting victimless crimes, fail because their
morality as law is wrong. See FULLER, supra note 44, at 231-32. Contrariwise, the law
can be very well used to enforce morality in promise-keeping.
47 See Coase, supra note 9, at 95-156.
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Hobbes's odd commitment to absolutism fits this institutionalist
perspective. He virtually refused to make arguments at the margin
of a going political order. In his system, marginal changes were the
full prerogative of the sovereign. This recourse to the sovereign is
analogous to the ultimate recourse of the institutionalist to the
institution for deciding cases. The institutionalist might allow
revision of the law through common law courts. But there is no way
to justify the status quo on which Coase works, except perhaps as
Hobbes might, by arguing that the expected costs to each and every
one of us of our moving to a new system or distribution are too
great.
For exchange relations, justification from mutual advantage
might seem to make sense a case at a time. But what we must
actually want in law is general, system-level principles for handling
and enforcing contracts. If the need for enforcement arises in any
given contract relation, then the parties no longer face the prospect
of a resolution that serves the mutual advantage of both. The
mutual advantage justification of the law of contracts or of any of
its principles is inherently at the system level.
To see the system-level nature of the argument from mutual
advantage most clearly, however, consider the way that torts are
handled, both in law and in law and economics. In a tort interac-
tion, at least one of the parties has suffered a harm and the law of
torts determines how the costs are to be borne by the parties. Can
we argue from mutual advantage here? Surely not at the individual-
case level. But tort law can be treated as analogous to contract law
in that there is an expected gain to all from having certain activities
available, despite their tendency to produce harmful side effects,
such as auto accident injuries.
We can serve mutual advantage ex ante by adopting an efficient
rule for tort cases. What we all would agree to is to be able to drive
under a regime for the allocation of the side-costs. When we argue
for the Coasean corollary-assignment of property rights on the
basis of their productive efficiency in the face of transaction
costs-the mutual advantage argument is strictly ex ante. Hence, we
can get a mutual advantage justification of a tort regime ex ante.
When the regime is actually brought to bear on a tort interaction,
however, one party may lose from the application of the tort
remedy.
Does the system-level justification really fit a mutual advantage
argument? Yes, but only if everyone is likely to be more or less
randomly on either side of the tort rule. If we are systematically
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divided into two classes with different but interacting behaviors,
there may be no mutual advantage rule for governing our interac-
tions. For example, suppose I am almost always going to be a driver
and you are almost always going to be a pedestrian. Now our
interactions are all like the single interaction. There are no
balancing interactions in which I have the driver's interests and you
have the pedestrian's interests. Every rule has the problem of the
instant decision in a single case. What I win, you lose. Each actual
settlement is a zero-sum conflict between two parties to a tort loss,
and the sum of all settlements is also a zero-sum conflict between
two distinctly defined classes of parties to all the tort losses. Hence,
a rule that lets the loss lie where it falls so long as the driver is
driving reasonably might systematically assign most of the interac-
tive costs of driving to nondrivers. 8
Much argument in law and economics is only implicitly
grounded in justification from mutual advantage. For example,
discussions of torts generally seem to take for granted that it is okay
to do things such as drive cars despite the virtually certain knowl-
edge that doing so may put us at risk of killing or injuring someone.
The issue is not whether I should go to jail for having driven at all,
but whether I should help to make you whole after our accident.
This may recall hoary discussions of the doctrine of double effect.
My intention when I drive is to get to a party, not to kill the person
I might accidentally hit along the way. Hence, I might do no wrong
if I do kill someone accidentally.
Coase gives a mutual advantage grounding of a version of this
principle of the doctrine of double effect without becoming
entangled in the simplistic causal action theory of that doctrine. In
Coase's causal theory, I could do harm to you only if I am not
acting merely on my own but am interacting with you. Your harm
was, therefore, jointly produced by us, even though your only part
in the joint causation may have been to be standing on a particular
bit of sidewalk. If we think your harm was jointly caused, it is odd
to attribute moral fault to me-I have only a joint causal effect. Yet
much of tort law has been a law of fault finding. On a Coasean or
law and economics account, it is eminently plausible that everything
4 Note that this issue is further complicated by the possibility that your evaluation
of a given physical loss might dramatically differ from mine, even though the physical
damage done is the same. Your violinist's hand may be worth much more than my
typist's hand. For extended discussion, see GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS,
ATITrUDES, AND THE LAW 24-25 (1985).
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I did was right and everything you did was right, and yet the joint
outcome of our actions was a grievous harm to one of us.
IV. EFFICIENCY AS A NORM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
In the law, the norm of efficiency, which is generally definable
as mutual advantage, works the way strong norms typically work.
Strong norms are associated with groups, and they are typically
norms of exclusion.49 Within a group of those who share such a
norm, group members enforce obedience to the norm against each
other. Enforcement works through the exclusion of norm violators
from the group or its activities. Exclusion can take dramatic and
vicious forms, or it can work in more subtle ways. For example, in
the legal system, judges and other officers of the court can be fully
excluded from the system through disbarment or removal from
office. More typically, however, they are merely excluded from
having influence. Some norms, such as norms of honesty and
fairness, can be universal, in which case they are typically weak
because they cannot effectively be enforced through the exclusion
of violators.
As is true for some but not all groups that share a norm, the
group of officers in the American legal system is relatively hierarchi-
cal. Moreover, and this may be a point of great importance, the
hierarchy is headed by a group of nine justices in the Supreme
Court, not by a single justice. Consider the Supreme Court during
a period of relative constancy of its membership, say a decade or so.
Usually, the Court of one year is only one or two justices away from
being the Court of a couple of years earlier or later. There is,
therefore, something like a rolling ten-year average opinion on the
Court on any long-standing issue of interpretation." Except on
very divided issues, the view of the Court several years ago will be
the view of the Court this year. Hence, lower courts can generally
expect that recent precedents will be determinative for new
cases-insofar as those precedents are clear.
Suppose I am ajudge on a panel ofjudges in a lower court and
that I am not fully convinced of the correctness of the current
49 See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 72-106
(1995) (explaining the difference between norms of exclusion and other norms).
o See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 309, 349-55 (1995) (evaluating the Court's decisions over time in terms
of blocs that do not change from year to year, but rather, change over periods of
time).
MAGIC ON THE FRONTIER
Supreme Court precedent or rule on some matter. If, in a case
before my court, I lead a majority of my panel in arguing against
that Supreme Court view, we can confidently expect to be over-
ruled. If I lead a majority in fitting our decision to the Supreme
Court view, however, perhaps with novel twists that expand on the
current precedent, we may actually prevail in our marginal novelty.
My colleagues on the court are likely to go along with the Supreme
Court if they are either ambitious in wanting to have real effect on
the law or if they seek a relatively comfortable existence. Hence, I
am much more likely to be successful in forming an effective
majority if I tailor my arguments to fit the Supreme Court view. Of
course, some of my colleagues might be cantankerous enough not
to care for either ambition or comfort, and some might be righteous
enough about some range of issues not to care about seeming
cantankerous on those particular issues.
Suppose I master the relationship with my colleagues and I am
successful in having marginal influence on those cases in which I
merely stretch precedent to cover new ground. I may now be taken
more seriously when I write an opinion on a more novel issue. The
more the Supreme Court finds in my opinions to use, the more it
will look to my opinions in the future. Sam Rayburn's advice to new
members of Congress was, "You have to go along to get along."
This is good advice in collective endeavors of all kinds, including
the collective endeavor of judge-made law. As a lower court judge,
I may have far more effect on the law if I generally fit my opinions
to precedent than if I do not.
On this analysis, we can understand how rules work as norms in
at least a vague sense. Beyond that, however, we want an account
of why they motivate officers in the legal system. They do this in
two ways. First, they affect the behavior of potential parties to
litigation, and this has incentive effects on judges and others.
Second, they may directly affect the motivations of judges and
officers in the legal system and thus have incentive effects on others
in the system, including potential litigants. These two mechanisms
are not typically separable because each works only in tandem with
the other. The general presumption is that all parties to the legal
system will strive for the best results for themselves in their
particular roles, but, because their roles vary substantially, there can
be distorting interests that separate the interests of officers of the
system from those of the parties who come before the law.
In Part IV.A, I will consider the ways in which efficiency for
litigators can be a norm within the legal system. Then, very briefly,
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in Part IV.B, I will note ways in which internal concern with effi-
ciency can distort the working of that system. I will conclude the
discussion of the norm of efficiency with remarks on its implications
for the rule of law.
I A. Efficiency for Potential Litigants
Paul Rubin, George Priest, and others have argued that rules
that are inefficient for litigators will face more frequent litigation
and will, therefore, tend to be changed sooner than rules that are
efficient." What makes this claim compelling, at least in some
areas of the law, is the strategic structure of the pattern of litigation.
If there were a mutual advantage rule to govern some range of
interactions, repeat litigators, even though they might stand to gain
by getting a contrary ruling in an instant case, would benefit better
ex ante from the mutual advantage rule if it were the guiding rule
of law. If a mutual advantage rule is the current precedent,
potential repeat litigators may now conform their behavior in
advance to the rule that genuinely serves their interest overall, even
if not in an occasional case. Indeed, they only stand to lose in the
longer run from litigating successfully against the rule in a particu-
lar case. The result is that, as Rubin and others would argue, the
mutual advantage rule comes under fewer attacks than a rule that
would not genuinely serve mutual advantage.
Although most judges might never make any inferences about
the efficiency of any rule, an occasional Judge Hand or Holmes or
Posner will see the issue whole and articulate a rule that is mutually
advantageous. And surely, some of those who would benefit from
a new mutual advantage rule will see the issue well enough to
understand where their advantage lies, and they will do their best
to make judges understand the issue as well.
Of course, this argument works best for rules that govern classes
of interactions in which parties fall more or less randomly on one
side or the other of an issue. In general, we should expect
especially efficient rules for commercial law governing transactions
between large firms that are often involved on "both sides" of any
rule. Some common law rules may be biased in favor of one class
of parties if there are two or more classes in more or less constant
"' See generally Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD.
51 (1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,
6J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977).
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opposition on fixed sides of any rule, so that there is no mutual
advantage rule. The bias will be especially great if one class of
parties contains repeat litigators and the other does not. Hence, in
the criminal law we might expect rules that commonly benefit
prosecutors rather than rules that are mutually advantageous.
Finally, norms generally work best when violations are relatively
public information so that sanctioning violators can be effective and
may even be incumbent on some members of the relevant group.52
It is a particular advantage of legal norms within the legal system
that they and their violations are virtually public documents. If
Judge A makes an argument that is stupid, unconstitutional, or
contrary to reigning precedent, he and his argument will be widely
known. If'Judge B makes an argument that is novel and compelling,
she and her argument will also be widely known. But Judge B and
her argument may become influential, while Judge A loses influence
from making his argument.
All of these arguments suggest that, at least for many parts of
the common law, there will be incentives internal to the judiciary to
fix on rules that serve the mutual advantage of potential litigators.
No particular judge need understand that this is what makes those
rules compelling, but all or most judges will understand that these
rules constitute strong norms for their own decisions in relevant
cases because, when they decide against these rules, they will be
opposed by their colleagues or overturned by a higher court.
B. Efficiency Within the Legal System
The concern of officers of the legal system with efficiency need
not focus only on efficiency for the litigants. As is true of humans
in varied contexts, judges typically wish to reduce the burdens they
face. General and system-level norms that are mutually beneficial
for litigants also benefit judges directly by easing their jobs and by
making their decisions more coherent. While the concerns of
potential litigants tend to produce efficient rules for the content of
decisions, the concerns ofjudges will go further to produce efficient
rules for procedure. An important element in establishing a mutual
advantage rule in some contexts is that the parties are repeat
players. Again, one-time participants can be expected to strive for
the best result for themselves in the instant case only. Repeat
52 See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2241-42 (1996).
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participants care about the general rule that gets established. They
want rules that serve their interests best in the long run or on
average. The officers of the legal system are overwhelmingly repeat
players, who therefore have reason and opportunity to push for
rules that serve their interests.
Much of court procedure is de facto a matter of common law.
This is true for criminal as well as civil law. The interest that judges
have in rules for decision that improve the coherence of their
decisions is similar to the interest they have in standardizing
procedure to enable them to perform better. Sometimes, such
standardization may work to the mutual advantage of those who
come before the law, but it need not. For example, prosecutors and
judges might have an incentive to settle most criminal cases by plea
bargaining. This need not, even ex ante, be advantageous for those
who are charged. Hence, the procedure of plea bargaining may be
efficient for those in the system but not for those who come before
it.
C. Norms and the Rule of Law
The possibility of self-enforcing norms internal to the legal
system gives perhaps the most plausible sense one can attribute to
any claim that we have a government of laws, not of men. Note that
such norms are sociologically produced and enforced within the
legal system. They are not internal to the very concept of law, as
some might argue that certain norms must be.53 Rather, their
existence can be explained by the way they work and the way they
are enforced. If they are to work well, they must generally be self-
enforcing. There may be many such norms, although I have argued
primarily for the single norm of efficiency and its subnorms. The
argument for these particular norms is that they are backed by clear
and systematic incentives to officers of the legal system and to
parties to legal actions, especially commercial contract actions, but
also to many others.
The power of the norm of efficiency is that it can give very
strong incentives to officers of the legal system to behave in certain
" Lon L. Fuller argued that certain norms are part of the (necessary) internal
morality of law. See generally FULLER, supra note 44; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958). For the other
side of this articulate debate, see generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593 (1958).
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ways. Concern for their interest in decisions under the law gives
direct incentives to many litigants. For officers of the legal system,
the incentives come indirectly through the norm of efficiency, which
acts as a norm of exclusion. The strength of such norms, again,
comes from the interest that group members have in spontaneously
enforcing them against violators. The norm of efficiency in the law
is backed by institutional coordination on efficiency concerns.
This possibility of spontaneous "self" enforcement by the group
runs against the thesis of Hobbes that the governor or sovereign is
above the law." We create a complex institutional structure to
handle the law, and that structure imposes constraints on individu-
als within it to behave in certain regular and largely beneficial ways.
There need be no external coercer to elicit such behavior, and the
relevant actors need have no strongly held normative views to get
them to behave that way. They behave relatively well because it is
in their interest to follow the requisite norm.
V. INHERENT CONSERVATISM?
Critics often assert that the approach of law and economics is
inherently conservative.55 There can be little doubt that Hobbes's
view of the likely effect of any effort at reform has grossly conserva-
tive implications. The apparent conservatism of law and economics
might be supposed to spring from two quite different but related
considerations: its marginalism and the epistemological skepticism
in which it is grounded. But arguments from these considerations
do not withstand scrutiny.
Epistemological skepticism is not itself conservative. It is a
matter only of facts and our knowledge of them. Neither conserva-
tism nor any other value can be attributed directly to such knowl-
edge claims. For example, it would be odd to criticize someone for
being conservative about changes that she thought, as a matter of
fact, could not possibly be made to work. In this sense, Ludwig von
Mises and Friedrich Hayek were not conservative merely from their
belief that a command economy could not produce as great welfare
as a market economy.56 They were arguably conservative in their
beliefs that a society with inequality and greater productivity and
'4See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 313.
1 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980).
m See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIAISM 102-05 (1981) (1922); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 73-74 (1944).
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innovation is better than one with less inequality and less productiv-
ity, but in this respect their views agree to at least a considerable
extent with that of Rawls, whose difference principle allows
inequality if it is the result of productivity that makes even the worst
off better off.5 7 Only when coupled with value commitments, such
as welfare or autonomy, do relevant knowledge claims entail
conservative or radical policies.
It is possible, of course, that the epistemological claims of
Sidgwick and many advocates of law and economics happen to be
especially shared by conservatives. This correlation of epistemo-
logical views with value commitments might arise merely from the
broadly accepted dictum that "ought" implies "can.""8 If we
cannot know what it takes to make society radically better in some
respect, then it is not true that we ought to make it so. As a mere
matter of fact, it might be true that the possibilities for change
swamp our value commitments. Perhaps as a matter of intellectual
history, conservatives have generally reached their value positions
from the constraints imposed by their sociological beliefs. Those
with less restrictive epistemological beliefs might have believed
more readily in the possibility of effecting radical changes for the
better.
George Stigler asserts that "the professional study of economics
makes one politically conservative."59 In making this claim, he
presumably means not that all economists are stalwart conservatives
in the political sense, but only that the study of economics likely
pushes them in that direction. What he means by saying economists
are conservative is that, by virtue of their training and their
understanding, economists tend to support free market devices over
government control.6" That is, he believes a small number of
people in a central government cannot be relevantly smarter than
thousands of entrepreneurs. And he supposes that an empirically
grounded education and career in economics convinces one that
this is true. There can, however, be returns to scale and organiza-
tion, as Toyota, DuPont, and many other large firms suggest, and
5 See RAWLS, supra note 42, at 75-78.
See RUSSELL HARDIN, MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 53 (1988).
'9 GEORGEJ. STICLER, The Politics of Political Economists, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY
OF ECONoMics 51, 52 (1965).
6' In Stigler's words, a conservative in economic matters is one "who wishes most
economic activity to be conducted by private enterprise, and who believes that abuses
of private power will usually be checked, and incitements to efficiency and progress
usually provided, by the forces of competition." Id. at 53.
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there is no a priori reason to suppose that such returns could not
continue for some purposes up to the level of the organization of
a whole society. We might suppose that Stigler's point rests on
Austrian skepticism about the knowledge available to the people in
central government, but such a strong position would require
unskeptical confidence in the economist's knowledge of how a
market works. On this view, the conservative must play the game of
Hobbes, calling on skepticism when that helps and calling on firm
belief when that helps.
Oddly, on Stigler's view, although law and economics is widely
attacked for its conservatism, it is not necessarily conservative just
because it builds from the status quo of institutional arrangements,
including extant property rights. If it finally is conservative-in
Stigler's sense of being pro-market-in its actual arguments and
applications, that is because its arguments cumulatively tend to
produce market institutions.
There is a widely used vernacular sense in which conservatism
merely favors the status quo, somehow defined, over change. In
this sense, perhaps the conservatism both of economics and of law
and economics is as much a theoretical as an empirical result. For
more than a century, the dominant tradition in western economics
has been marginalist.61 In this tradition, there is no point in
talking about the overall value of organizing society one way rather
than another. Economics only provides vocabulary and theory for
discussing the marginal value of a change. We are in the world of
Hume, Pareto, and Coase, not in that of Hobbes or Bentham. This
may be the right place to be, and we may conclude that economic
conservatism is not merely empirically well grounded, but that it is
theoretically incumbent on us as well.
This analysis does not, however, tell the whole story. In addition
to empirical lessons and the appeal of theory, contemporary
economics is built on a genuine value commitment. The value is
marginalist welfarism with an uneasy mix of interpersonally
noncomparable and interpersonally comparable elements. If
welfarism were inherently marginalist, then it would be conservative;
but the issue for an ordinal welfarism is not that the judgments are
marginal in the sense of being trivial or minor. Hobbes's holistic
theory of the mutual advantage of having a state is welfarist, not
61 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Adoption of the Marginal Utility Theoy, in THE
ECONOMIST As PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 72, 78-85 (1982) (detailing the
historical development of the marginal utility theory).
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marginalist. That theory is conceptually coherent and even
empirically plausible. Welfarism is not, therefore, inherently
marginaist. Rather, it is only comparative or relative.
The genuinely conservative element of this line of theory is that
it constrains change to what would be mutually advantageous-
thereby ruling out supposed improvements that depend on tradeoffs
and aggregation of interpersonally comparable welfares. If we can
only do what will be mutually advantageous, we automatically
privilege the status quo. It is sometimes noted that utilitarianism
was once the moral theory of political radicals and reformers, but
that it is now the theory of conservatives.62 Indeed, it is the
implicit moral theory of most western economists and perhaps now
of most eastern economists as well. Part of the change is the
abandonment of cardinal, interpersonally comparative utility theory.
If the issue is the skepticism that leads to marginalism, Hobbes
does not fit because he was unwilling to take up debate about
marginal changes. In some ways, the most far-reaching skeptic in
modern economics was Friedrich Hayek, whojustified the decentral-
ized market on the ground that the epistemology of a central
organization could not match that of economic actors taken
spontaneously together.8 Hayek claimed he was not a conservative
but was a Whig." In making this claim he merely read the earlier
vocabulary of economic liberalism to mean what Stigler meant by
economic conservatism. Hayek, however, was intellectually
inconsistent if his value theory was welfarist and not interpersonally
comparative because he clearly supposed that switching from
nonmarket to market devices is good, although such a switch is
likely to entail losses in welfare for some.
A commitment to mutual advantage might block intervention to
help those who are-speaking with interpersonal comparisons of
welfare-woefully worse off than the norm. It may be true, either
for Stigler's empirical reasons or for theoretical reasons, that we
cannot intervene in such cases without severe distortion of the
larger economy, which reduces its productivity and the welfare of
others. A modestly more generous value commitment that
62 See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICs 102-03
(1972).
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1948).
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, Why IAm Not a Conservative, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 397, 408 (1960).
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somewhat violates the collective implication of self-interest might
allow such intervention anyway.
In an actual economy, we cannot even honor the Pareto
principle. If there were enormously many sellers and buyers, my
welfare would be unaffected by whether you are also a seller; but,
if I own the only restaurant at my ihtersection and you open
another across from me, I may be massively affected by your selling
in my market. True, all of your transactions may be voluntary
exchanges that benefit both you and your partners, but the result
may not push all of us toward the frontier of mutually advantageous
allocation because it may reduce my welfare. Indeed, it may even
bankrupt me.
CONCLUSION
Mutual advantage is a relatively compelling holistic normative
principle for social organization-when it applies. Hobbes applied
the principle in this manner, although the principle will not yield
his determinate recommendations if we know even a bit of social
science. In an ordinal welfarist theory, to say that all individuals are
better off allows us to say that society is better off. There is no
fallacy of composition so long as we suppose that the latter
statement is merely shorthand for the former. Unfortunately, all it
yields is comparative claims such as "state A is better than state B,"
while it may be indeterminate in the comparison of state A to state
C.
Mutual advantage may be a much less compelling normative
principle for marginal changes. At the margin, exclusive resort to
the principle is inherently conservative. Utilitarians-who were once
political radicals-can readily reject it if they think that even rough
interpersonal comparisons of welfare are possible.65 It is conserva-
tive in a sense different from that of Stigler, who labels commitment
to the market as conservative (a view that makes the current radicals
in eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics "conservative").
Mutual advantage, on the other hand, is conservative in its obei-
sance to the status quo. Vast systemic changes, such as those
currently underway in many eastern nations, cannot plausibly be
considered mutually advantageous, because they will surely make
many people net losers.
66
65 See HARDIN, supra note 58, at 126-27 (noting that "if no interpersonal
comparisons of welfare can be made, there can be no issue of distributive justice").
' We might nevertheless explain these changes sociologically on the claim that
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Can we resolve any of the indeterminacies that remain in
efficiency theories? We might be able to do so if we could move
part of the way toward Bentham or Posner's interpersonally
comparable measures of utility or wealth. The interpersonal
comparisons we actually make are sometimes marginal, sometimes
holistic. Marginally, we might say that my itch is less harmful than
your broken leg or that my large raise in salary is less good than
your finally getting a job. Holistically, we might say that your
plentiful existence with long life prospects in a peaceful and
productive society is better than my impoverished existence with
short life prospects in a destitute and violent society. These are, in
both the marginal and the holistic cases, merely ordinal compari-
sons.
We may now think it better to make one life a bit less good in
order to enhance the other substantially. Or, more systematically,
we might think it good to transfer resources from a very well off
class to a much poorer class. Here, however, we may not be able to
do what Coase's theorem suggests we can. Coase first separates
production from allocation to maximize production as measured in
current prices, and then goes on to allocate benefits.
If changes in production are principally a matter of changing
property inputs, Coase's move should work, subject as always to
transaction costs; but, if changes in production are very much a
matter of changing labor inputs, especially in the form of greater
commitment, then allocations may affect outputs. This is the
problem that drives Rawls's difference principle, according to which
we would consent to inequalities in reward for work to the extent
that those inequalities lead to greater production that benefits even
the worst off in the society.
Finally, note that Posner is quite catholic in what he includes
under wealth. Coase is also catholic. True, his examples typically
involve dollar amounts of costs and benefits to relevant parties, but
the dollars are a device, and they may be traded for other things.
Moreover, he says we must be fairly broad in our accounting of
welfare effects. He even cites, perhaps partly tongue in cheek,
Frank Knight's view that problems of welfare economics must
ultimately dissolve into a study of esthetics and morals. 7 Pareto's
they do serve the mutual advantage of politically important groups. See RUSSELL
HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONAUISM, AND DEMOCRACY chs. 1, 5 (forthcoming
1997).
67 See Coase, supra note 9, at 154.
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principles seem able to accommodate any values, although they
cannot handle production.
Unlike the modern writers, Hobbes seemed to prefer to keep
economic and survival issues separate from non-material issues,
which he never discussed in Leviathan. Why the difference?
Perhaps just the development of utility theory, the most articulate
and extensive of all value theories, over the past three centuries. Or
perhaps because in the conditions of his time, Hobbes thought
other concerns were swamped by the problem of survival and
material prosperity. They were for him roughly what primary goods
are for Rawls's theory. Before material goods are secured, Hobbes
supposed that people would not be likely to invest heavily in many
alternative values. 68 To some extent, this is even a constitutive
claim. For example, one cannot have a value for group identity in
a Hobbesian state of nature. Hence, Hobbes's initial values of
survival and welfare are prior to such socially determined values as
identity. It is because later theorists who champion such values are
writing about going societies that they can sensibly bring such values
into their accounts. However, such other values cannot plausibly be
kept out of arguments about reform and revolution, unless one
thinks the expected benefit of securing the right regime could never
offset the expected risk of chaotic anarchy.
We can conclude that various efforts to take us to the frontier
of mutual benefit have greatly improved our understanding of the
problems of ordinal welfarism, but they have not resolved all
problems. Hobbes and Coase have proposed extraordinary moves
that make the program of mutual advantage seem plausibly
workable in some contexts, both holistic and marginal, but they still
leave us with indeterminacies. To resolve these, we might impose
at least ordinal interpersonal comparisons, which, however, violate
the principle of mutual advantage from which Hobbes, Pareto,
Coase, and much of law and economics have worked. Interpersonal
comparisons might, however, provide a common refuge for judges
faced with difficult cases in which long-run efficiency is not likely to
be affected by the present decision.
Where mutual advantage applies in the law-that is, where all
relevant parties can be best served by a rule that benefits them all
in the long run of the many interactions in which they might be
involved-it yields a powerful norm of efficiency within the legal
68 See HOBBES, supra note 2, at 186.
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system. This norm forces disparate judges into relatively coherent
positions on major issues, even when they do not individually
understand what that position is and when they only have recourse
to a collection of rules and precedents whose systematic intelligence
they need not grasp.
